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Abstract: The decades immediately following the Glorious Revolution
in 1688 witnessed a variety of political, social and structural re-
sponses to this cataclysmic event. In Ireland, religious conflict and
economic under-development, as well as the devastation of war from
1689 to 1691, combined to ensure that the Anglo-Irish body politic
found it difficult to capture the fruits of success from an English
polity that had gradually accreted to itself much of the political power
and economic wealth of the country. By 1704, however, the Anglo-
Irish had managed to appropriate to themselves some of the eco-
nomic and constitutional benefits of the Revolution by exploiting
various parliamentary practices and structures. One of their strategies
centered around developing and leveraging the role of the Public Ac-
counts Committee as a means of imposing accountability on the ex-
ecutive and its officials. To achieve this the members were required to
understand, contest and reconfigure official accounting information.
INTRODUCTION
The cultural construction of state power attends all imperial
projects [Said, 1993; Wilson, 1995; Landes, 1998]. An apprecia-
tion of this has allowed recent scholarship to map more compre-
hensively those cultural aspects of early modern European ex-
pansionism that both complemented and supplemented this
politico-military endeavor [Bowen, 1996]. One consequence is
that the entire experience of the colonized is now more capable
of being articulated within a literature that eschews the earlier
elision of socio-cultural aspects of the imperial process: defeated
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peoples encountered not only the might of armies but also the
tyranny of clerks. Thus, issues of language, religion, profession-
alisation and race are now regularly summoned to contour more
thoroughly the impact of colonization [Johnson and Caygill,
1971; Said, 1978, 1993; Johnson, 1982; Wilson, 1995; Bowen,
1996; Chua and Poullaos, 1998; Annisette, 2000].
As part of this process the ways in which accountants, ac-
counting information and accountability formed elements of the
armory of imperialism have begun to be explored [Tinker, 1980;
Chew and Greer, 1997]. Distinguishing between ‘hardwares’ of
imperialism, such as military arms, and ‘softwares,’ such as lan-
guage, disease and accounting [Fanon, 1963; Headrick, 1981,
1988; Miller and Rose, 1990; Said, 1993; Bell et al., 1995; Neu,
2000a, b] various authors have identified and tracked the man-
ner in which these technologies facilitated the process of con-
quest and colonization. The vocabulary of colonialism has been
useful, therefore, in contextualizing the manner in which ac-
counting helped to translate imperial objectives into practical
effect, in the process mediating the relationship between the
colonial power and the colonized [Davis and Huttenback, 1988;
Miller and Rose, 1990; Preston et al., 1997; Neu, 1999, 2000a, b].
This paper extends our understanding of the ways in which
accounting information can be used to affect the regulative and
distributive ambitions of powerful elites [Miller and Rose, 1990;
Preston et al., 1997]. It does so by recounting an episode in
which accounting information was not only used by the colonial
power to impose government from a distance, but was also suc-
cessfully employed by that power’s erstwhile agents to contest
legislative, jurisdictional and property rights [cf. Davie, 2000].
Consequently, it not only identifies accounting as a tool of colo-
nialism, but also elaborates upon the consequences of conflict
within the colonial power, where the principal and agent imag-
ine, construct and deconstruct tools of oppression for their own
purposes. Thus, it explores an area to which little attention has
been given: the conflicts existing between the metropolitan cen-
tre and a colonial elite - a conflict that was of relatively semantic
importance to the colonized – and the extent to which account-
ing information was used and exploited by the respective players
within this hierarchy of powers [Neu, 2000b]. Focusing on the
role of accountability and financial control in constituting rela-
tionships of domination and subordination, it describes a situa-
tion in which a politically and economically vulnerable colonial
elite succeeded in leveraging its command of budgetary proce-
dures and accounting detail to secure significant constitutional
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concessions. While presenting accounting information as one
means by which the relationship between colonizer and colo-
nized could be reinforced, therefore, it is primarily concerned
with the way in which those perceived by the defeated natives as
representatives of the imperial power marshaled accounting in-
formation to advance their claims to jurisdictional authority and
economic aggrandizement vis-à-vis the mother country.
OUTLINE
The period immediately following the Glorious Revolution
in England and the subsequent war in Ireland from 1689 to
1691, witnessed a struggle between the bodies politic in both
countries as each tried to appropriate the political and economic
spoils that followed the defeat of James II. For the parliament in
London, which had effectively legislated for Ireland for much of
the previous three decades, it offered the opportunity to copper-
fasten its claims to legislative and judicial supremacy over Ire-
land. For the minority Anglican Anglo-Irish community, the tra-
ditional representatives of the colonial power, it presented an
opportunity to exploit its loyalty to the Williamite cause with a
view to shaping a political and constitutional settlement for Ire-
land that would secure its ascendancy over not only the defeated
Catholic population, but also its erstwhile allies, the dissenting
Protestant community. The ambitions of the Anglo-Irish could
only be secured, however, if the legislative and jurisdictional
supremacy of the Irish parliament, which they controlled, could
be reasserted. This required that the more ‘patriotic’ members of
the Anglo-Irish body politic gradually regain power and influ-
ence over Ireland’s affairs from the mother parliament in Lon-
don [Hayton, 1987; Connolly, 1992; Bartlett, 1992; O’Regan,
2000; Barnard, 2003].
This paper recounts one aspect of this ongoing struggle, one
in which accounting information and issues of accountability,
transparency and financial control emerged as proxies by which
the broader constitutional agenda was advanced. In essence, as
one means by which they sought to re-assert their legislative
prerogative, some members of the Irish parliament attempted to
exploit their part in the cumbersome process by which the
Money bill [or “supply”] was determined. Their strategy revolved
around developing the importance and independence of the
Public Accounts Committee. Their aim was to control and
strengthen the role of this committee in the supply process such
that the English parliament and executive would be forced to
3
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concede the Irish parliament’s demands for more regular sit-
tings. By reversing the marginalization of the Irish parliament
that had occurred over recent decades, they hoped to advance
their more immediate goal of ensuring that the Anglo-Irish com-
munity would play a central role in determining the post-
Revolution constitutional and land settlements for Ireland.
Realizing this ambition required a degree of political and
financial sophistication not previously evidenced by these
Anglo-Irish politicians as they sought to counter moves by the
English authorities to retain control over the budgetary and fis-
cal systems. As part of this endeavor they were required to un-
derstand, contest and reconfigure financial information and
forecasts presented by the English government and officials. In
this, the members of the Irish parliament were facilitated by a
confluence of the interests of a powerful Anglo-Irish Whig fac-
tion as well as the idiosyncrasies of the Irish political system. By
1704 they had successfully secured a scheme that placed the
Public Accounts Committee at the centre of the fiscal process.
Much to the chagrin of the English body politic, this ensured
that issues of accountability, transparency and control became
central to the manner in which the relationship between the
English and Irish parliaments would henceforth be mediated.
The paper is divided into four sections. The first section
outlines the background which gave rise to Ireland’s unique con-
stitutional status vis-à-vis England and the political and eco-
nomic conditions within which the resulting constitutional con-
flict was played out. The second section traces the emergence of
the Public Accounts Committee in William III’s first Irish parlia-
ment in 1692 and its evolution during William’s second Irish
parliament from 1695 to 1699 when a compromise was achieved
in relation to the granting of supply. The third section deals with
the parliament of 1703-04 during which the Public Accounts
Committee became a critical element in the attempt by Anglo-
Irish Whig ‘patriots’ to ensure a greater degree of control over
the legislative and judicial process. The final section provides
some concluding observations.
BACKGROUND
Originally invaded in the 12th century by a Norman force
that had the blessing of both the king of England and the pope,
Ireland’s history had been intricately intertwined since that
point with that of its larger neighbor. For four hundred years
the pattern was one of gradual subjugation of the native Gaelic
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population by an increasingly dominant English interest that
couched its actions in terms of an obligation to ‘civilize’ unruly
natives [Canny, 1988; Leerssen, 1988; Said, 1993]. With Henry
VIII’s repudiation of the temporal authority of the pope, the
struggle in Ireland assumed a religious dimension. Positions of
authority and influence were now only entrusted to those who
supported the new state Anglican Church. By the time of Eliza-
beth I’s death in 1603, a small but politically and militarily
dominant Anglican, Anglo-Irish minority, had secured political
and economic control. And while this Anglo-Irish elite sought to
parade their own parliament and constitutional history as evi-
dence of sovereignty, Ireland nevertheless exhibited many of the
hallmarks of a colonial outpost [Bottigheimer, 1992; York, 1994;
McLoughlin, 1999].1
A series of ‘plantations’ over the course of the 17th century,
in which tens of thousands of Protestant settlers were planted
into Ireland, especially in the Northeast corner, complicated the
ethnic, religious and political mix further. The bulk of those
settled in the Northeast hailed from Scotland and traced their
Protestant heritage to a dissenting Presbyterian tradition that
made them suspect even to the Anglican authorities in Dublin.
Both Anglican and dissenting traditions were united, however,
in their hatred and fear of the numerically superior native
Gaelic Catholic population. On two occasions during the 17th
century this fragile Protestant alliance had occasion to be tested.
When the Catholic population rebelled in 1641 and again in
1688, the Protestant minority, reinforced from England, suc-
ceeded in overturning initial Catholic gains. The war from 1689
to 1691, which saw the Catholic population summarily defeated,
laid the basis for over a century of Protestant ascendancy. One
immediate consequence was a land settlement under which the
1 On the one hand, the Anglo-Irish political nation liked to present Ireland as
a sovereign kingdom answerable to the monarch as king of Ireland, with its own
parliament, Privy Council and executive. However, the reality, as the English
parliament constantly liked to remind its Irish counterpart, was that effective
political and military power and authority resided in London. Thus, while the
Irish parliament claimed independence, various statutes, particularly Poynings’
Law, effectively neutralized its capacity to initiate legislation, and the English
House of Lords regularly overturned decisions made by the Irish Lords. Like-
wise the ‘chief executive’ of the Irish government, the Lord Lieutenant, was
appointed by the king at the behest of the English government, while the Irish
Privy Council and executive were comprised of English placemen and individual
Irishmen considered loyal to whichever political faction happened to be in
power in London [Connolly, 1992; York, 1994; Hayton, 1995; McLoughlin,
1999].
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native Catholic majority retained less than one seventh of the
land. This subjugation was codified into a legal scheme known
as the ‘Penal Laws’ in which religious affiliation was assumed to
be a proxy for ethnicity and political loyalty [Foster, 1988;
Connolly, 1992; Bartlett, 1992; O’Regan, 2000].
While Ireland was seeking to recover from the devastating
effects of war and the resulting economic stagnation, England
was experiencing a financial transformation facilitated in part
by the Glorious Revolution. The growth in indirect taxation, the
professionalisation of the treasury and the emergence of embry-
onic forms of credit financing provided the context within
which the increased financial demands that accompanied pro-
longed war with France could be satisfied by a resurgent parlia-
ment and a nascent financial market. By 1695, the English par-
liament had seized to itself an authority to influence financial
policy to an extent unimaginable under the Stuarts [Dickson,
1967; Brewer, 1989; Neal, 1990; Braddick, 1994, 1996].
In stark contrast, Ireland was little affected by the changes
in the financial system and outlook then occurring in England
[Kiernan, 1930; McGrath, 2000].2 There were a number of rea-
sons for this. One was the country’s stage of economic develop-
ment. A peripheral island without any central financial focus
such as that supplied by the City of London in England, Ireland
did not enjoy the level of economic, financial or political matu-
rity conducive to such an evolution. However, the country’s un-
developed financial and taxation structures could be traced, in
the main, to the almost feudal nature of its fiscal system and the
retarding effect of the Restoration Settlement that had accompa-
nied the accession of Charles II in 1660. The primary means by
which the Irish civil and military costs [or ‘establishments’] were
financed was the hereditary revenue, a perpetual revenue stream
available to the crown without parliamentary consent. The prin-
cipal sources were various crown rents, drink licenses and other
casual duties. However, as part of the settlement under which
Charles II assumed the throne, in 1666 the Irish parliament
granted additional quit rents, customs, duties, taxes and licenses
2 While considerable attention has been paid to the English public revenue
in the 17th and early 18th centuries, little work has been done on its Irish
equivalent. One of the most comprehensive studies remains Kiernan’s [1930] A
History of the Financial Administration of Ireland to 1817. This has only recently
been supplanted by Ivar McGrath, [2000] The Making of the Eighteenth Century
Irish Constitution, which places the revenue and supply functions at the centre
of the constitutional process. I would like to thank Ivar for his comments and
observations on an earlier draft of this paper.
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to the crown in perpetuity. An improving economy, together
with a Stuart policy for Ireland which placed a premium on
ensuring that it was neither a drain on resources nor a source of
unease, meant that the monarch was soon in a position to gov-
ern the country without having to consider recalling parliament
to augment supply. The result of the Irish parliament’s largesse,
therefore, was that Ireland was governed for the following 26
years without a parliament in Dublin. In the interim the mother
parliament in London managed to advance its claim to judicial
supremacy over the Irish parliament [Connolly, 1992; Bartlett,
1992; McGrath, 2000; O’Regan, 2000].
Such a situation could only continue while these hereditary
revenues exceeded the establishment. But one obvious and im-
mediate effect of the war of 1689-91 was that costs increased
dramatically at a time when revenues were almost non-existent.
In these circumstances the initiative returned to the Irish parlia-
ment, since only an increase in the range and/or rates of the
hereditary revenue would allow the civil and military establish-
ments to be met. By early 1692 the new monarchs, William and
Mary, were left with little option but to summon parliament to
meet in Dublin later that year [Hayton, 1981, 1995; Bartlett,
1992; Connolly, 1992].
THE PARLIAMENTS OF 1692 AND 1695-1699:
SOLE RIGHT, ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPROMISE
Those who gathered in Dublin in October 1692 for the first
Irish parliament in almost thirty years knew well that their ca-
pacity to reap the rewards of victory over James was linked to
their ability to re-establish the sovereignty of the Irish parlia-
ment in matters relating to Ireland. The lesson from the lengthy
break between parliaments was that this, in turn, was related to
the level of control that members could establish over the deter-
mination of the quantum and the length of supply. Thus, Anglo-
Irish interests would be best served by ensuring that supply was
only granted for a limited period, preferably two years, and at
relatively low levels [Conolly, 1992; McGrath, 2000].
However, an issue of more immediate concern to members
was the post-Revolution land settlement. When, in the first ses-
sion, the government managed to stymie debate on this, they
expressed their resentment in other ways. In particular, they
attempted to obstruct various measures intended to alleviate the
immediate financial crisis. This was evident at first when the
Commons came to deal with the Money bill. Contention on this
7
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issue centered on the question of ‘sole right’, i.e. the claim by the
Irish Commons as a sovereign parliament to have the ‘sole right’
to initiate legislation in this area. As evidence that the executive
could by no means presume a pliant parliament in voting a
supply sufficient to cover the Civil and Military establishments,
the members first insisted that they be given access to the vari-
ous financial and accounting records on which the calculations
of revenue and establishment costs were based. On October 12 a
committee was appointed ‘to search precedents how the com-
mittee of grievances may come at records, accompts and papers
in the hands of any of their majesties officers of the revenue and
others’ [Commons Journal Ireland [hereafter: CJI] 12 Oct. 1692].
This led to demands by members that full accounts be laid be-
fore the House. Reluctant revenue officials eventually acceded.
This in turn prompted further disputes between the members
and the executive with regard to both the quantum and the
length of supply. Only after the intervention of the monarch
were the members persuaded to grant additional duties. How-
ever, while allowing certain duties to be increased, members
refused to consider more than a two-year supply [CJI, 12 Oct.
1692; Bartlett, 1992; O’Regan, 2000].
In 1695, when a similar dispute threatened, a compromise
initiated by Lord Deputy Capel, whereby the government was
seen to retain the right to initiate the process, while the Irish
Commons was given the right to determine the ways and means
by which an additional supply was to be collected, ensured that
the ‘sole right’ issue was defused [CJI, 6 Sept. 1695]. Under this
scheme the government drafted and presented an initial supply
bill for one year. The significance of this lay in the fact that the
crown was seen to have initiated the process. The compromise
then allowed the Commons to raise Heads of a bill for the col-
lection of more substantial additional duties over subsequent
years. The result was a Commons inspired supply bill that, while
signaling the unhappiness of members at parallel initiatives of
the English parliament in relation to duties on woolen exports
from Ireland, provided the government with a significant
amount of additional income. Indeed, so successful was this
compromise that it was repeated in 1697 and again in 1699,
despite the fact that, in a maneuver opposed by those champion-
ing greater Irish parliamentary sovereignty, the executive did
manage to secure various additional duties on tobacco and some
other goods for a period of four years from 1699 [CJI, 21 Jan.
1699; McGrath, 2000].
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THE PARLIAMENT OF 1703-1704:
SECURING ACCOUNTABILITY
The additional hereditary revenues and duties granted in
1699 meant that the revenue would be in surplus up to and
including 1702. By 1703, however, unless parliament was sum-
moned and additional supplies granted, the cost of the establish-
ment would begin to exceed income. There were a number of
reasons, not related to the financial situation, why the ministry
in London found that this long interval suited its purposes.
These could be traced to the worsening relations between the
two parliaments that had followed the dissolution of William’s
second Irish parliament in 1699. For a start, the constitutional
fracas over legislative and judicial supremacy between London
and Dublin had escalated into a full-scale legal and political
cause celebre [O’Regan, 2000]. On the one hand a series of court
cases initiated in Ireland sought to have the jurisdictional pre-
rogative of the Irish parliament clearly established. On the other
hand the English parliament took every opportunity to encour-
age plaintiffs to appeal decisions of the Irish Lords to England
where the authority of the English Lords was promptly re-as-
serted. These tensions were fuelled by a series of pamphlets and
books that were unabashed in their championing of the appel-
late jurisdiction of the Dublin parliament [Foster, 1988; Kelly,
1988; Connolly, 1992; O’Regan, 2000].
The English parliament had also been to the fore in several
other episodes that had further soured relations. The passage of
a series of mercantilist laws in London had effectively ruined a
healthy Irish woolens trade in order to satisfy an English west-
country lobby. The linen trade, introduced into Ireland and
funded by a series of Linen Acts, was perceived by a generally
unappreciative populace to be an inappropriate and insufficient
replacement. Anglo-Irish grievances had been aggravated fur-
ther by the Act of Resumption passed in London in April 1700
that had voided many of the land settlements concluded over the
previous decade [Kelly, 1980; Connolly, 1992; Bartlett, 1992].
Apart altogether from the constitutional implications of such a
statute, the manner in which the Commissioners of Forfeiture
had gone about their business had inspired accusations of
corruption and favoritism. The fact that individuals such as Alan
Brodrick and William Conolly, the principal parliamentary
managers in Ireland, had been deprived of some of their lands
meant that this anger was bound to be reflected in the members’
attitude to the government’s parliamentary program whenever
9
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parliament eventually reconvened. There was also strong resent-
ment that the establishment was being further burdened by the
upkeep of several regiments based in the West Indies, as well as
the seemingly profligate manner in which the construction of
new barracks was being managed. The general economic mal-
aise that had begun in mid-1701 merely compounded Irish poli-
ticians’ and merchants’ sense of being seriously disadvantaged
by a constitutional arrangement that seemed to allow Irish po-
litical and economic priorities to be subordinated to the whims
and avarice of disparate English interest groups [Foster, 1988;
Bartlett, 1992; Connolly, 1992].
Ever alert to the potential for Irish politics and politicians to
complicate the domestic situation, English ministers were un-
willing to bring upon themselves, until absolutely necessary, the
disaffection that they were sure would follow the summoning of
a new Irish parliament. With the additional duties due to expire
by mid-1703, however, it eventually became counter-productive
for the ministry to defer summoning members to meet. In early
1703, therefore, it was announced by Queen Anne that a parlia-
ment was to be summoned to assemble in Dublin that autumn.
As this was the first parliament of the new monarch’s reign it
would be preceded by an election [Connolly, 1992; Bartlett, 1992].
Anglo-Irish politicians preparing for parliament in Dublin
in the autumn of 1703 were conscious of how their power had
again been eroded by the time-lag between parliaments, an in-
terval that had only been made possible by the generosity of the
previous parliament. Those attuned to the constitutional aspects
of the ongoing struggle were determined to ensure that this did
not occur again. Much depended, therefore, upon the ability of
the members, particularly in the Commons, to ensure that there
was no repeat of the carelessness of their predecessors in terms
of either the quantum or the length of supply. This would re-
quire that Anglo-Irish politicians seize greater control over the
supply process, investigate official calculations of budgetary
projections more closely and ensure that the Civil and Military
establishments were scrutinized assiduously [Connolly, 1992;
Bartlett, 1992; O’Regan, 2000].
This keener espousal of the place of parliament within the
body politic coincided with the emergence of the Brodrick fam-
ily and its ‘Cork Squadron’ as a significant force in the Irish
House of Commons. Growing out of a general unhappiness at
the gradual marginalization of the Anglo-Irish interest in Irish
polity, this had crystallized by the early 1700s into a quasi-
Whiggish position on the importance of parliament and the
10
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need for accountability of the executive in Dublin, its officers
and placemen. It marked the beginning of almost thirty years of
influence on the part of Alan Brodrick and various members of
his family. The fact that this faction found itself opposed by a
series of governments in London controlled by Marlborough,
Godolphin and Harley that were at least sympathetic to the
Tories, and which were in turn supported by an Irish ‘Court’
faction in parliament as well as an embryonic Irish Church
party, increased the likelihood of conflict [Jones, 1978; Kenyon,
1978; Holmes, 1987; Connolly, 1992].
The members of the Irish Commons were by now well
aware that the issues of legislative supremacy, economic influ-
ence and supply were inter-linked, and, prompted by Brodrick, a
small majority appeared willing to press for change. Since re-
cent sessions had made it clear that parliaments in Dublin were
only summoned when supply needed to be secured, it was obvi-
ous that supply bills of shorter duration would result in the
more regular convening of members. It was imperative, there-
fore, that those orchestrating the ‘patriotic’ stance ensure that
the process by which supply was granted be managed more
closely than before. This would necessitate the diligent attention
of various parliamentary managers, as well as careful scrutiny of
both the supply process and the officials responsible for its for-
mulation and management. In fact, what resulted was a system
for determining supply that represented a subtle but significant
shift in emphasis from the compromise of the 1695-99 parlia-
ment. It succeeded in further securing the role of the Irish Com-
mons in the supply process, while at the same time not trespass-
ing on the prerogative powers of the crown. The crucial factor
would be a keenly managed Public Accounts Committee whose
Whig members would succeed in imposing a degree of account-
ability and financial control not seen before in Ireland. In this
the capacity of the members to marshal, contest and manipulate
accounting information would be crucial. And it was a process
in which various members who were accomptants would play a
key role [McGrath, 2000].
Parliamentary Preliminaries: The advice to the government in
London from the executive in Dublin prior to parliament con-
vening had been that it should seek to continue the pattern
established in 1695-1699 by introducing the initial supply bill
providing for an extension of additional duties for one year. The
Commons could then introduce a bill for further additional
duties covering at least one extra year, and possibly two. This
11
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process, while tortuous, would at least allow the government to
argue that the right to initiate the supply process remained with
the executive and the crown. It was obvious, therefore, that the
government’s own officials had accepted the 1695 compromise
as a workable solution to the supply conundrum, one that might
ensure that the supply question would not prejudice debates on
constitutional grievances or complicate other items of business.
Brodrick, however, was determined to see that these arrange-
ments were modified more to parliament’s advantage. In various
meetings with the Dublin executive he argued that the Irish
Parliament had by now established its ‘sole right’ in the area of
supply and that the whole matter should be left to the Com-
mons. He warned that the political and economic climates were
such that any other approach might see supply rejected alto-
gether. In any case, he considered it unlikely that supply would
be granted for more than a one-year period. In response, Lord
Lieutenant Ormonde let it be known that, while he would at-
tempt to continue the 1695 compromise, he expected the Com-
mons to reciprocate with additional duties for a further two-
year period [Anon. [Brodrick, St.J.], 1701; Victory, 1989;
McGrath, 2000].
The Dublin executive’s carefully arranged plan ran into im-
mediate difficulties when the London government refused to
endorse any plan that did not explicitly guarantee more than a
one-year supply. Determined to ensure that the Irish Whigs
would not be allowed to exploit this issue to ensure more regu-
lar sessions, the government in London countered Brodrick’s
lobbying by insisting that a three-year supply bill be introduced
at the start of the session. However, a series of warnings from
Ormonde in Dublin that a more conciliatory approach would be
required eventually persuaded the government in London to be
less confrontational. In accordance with protocol, by late July a
one-year Money bill had been forwarded from London. The un-
derstanding in England was that this would lead to a further
supply bill from the Commons in Dublin that would augment
supply and extend it for a period of more than one year. In the
meantime, officials in both London and Dublin assumed that
they had secured Brodrick’s compliance by virtue of their prom-
ise to support his candidature for the position of Speaker of the
House of Commons, a post that brought with it considerable
power and patronage [Connolly, 1992; McGrath, 2000; O’Regan,
2000].
There were some indications that this consensus might
break down shortly before parliament convened. In particular,
12
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rumors that the ministry in London would seek an additional
supply over three years of £210,000 on the basis of a £70,000 per
annum increase in the additional duties, had begun to circulate.
It caused many parliamentary leaders to balk. In fact, this was
merely a ploy to make the government’s actual intentions seem
more palatable. Without informing the executive in Dublin, the
London government had quietly explored the possibility of se-
curing a two-year supply, seeking £50,000 per annum in addi-
tional duties, while at the same time requiring that the parlia-
ment undertake to pay off an opening debt at 30 September
1703, which government officials estimated at £103,368. In ef-
fect, they were asking for almost the same amount over a two-
year period as had been mooted for the three-year supply
[McGrath, 2000].
While calculated to intimidate the Irish members, the En-
glish government’s disingenuous policy was merely complicat-
ing an already fraught situation. Conscious of the widespread
nature of the discontent, Ormonde had already informed his
superiors in London that a pliant parliament should by no
means be presumed. There were persistent rumors that the
Anglo-Irish were organizing to obstruct government business
unless their grievances were addressed. If some additional legis-
lation acceptable to the members were not offered, then there
would be considerable difficulty in securing the passage of any
supply. One measure that the Lord Lieutenant had suggested
was a bill disabling Catholics further in the matter of inheriting
land. This would be especially appreciated in the light of the
many claims submitted by Catholics to the Commissioners of
Forfeiture. To assist the London government in its deliberations
a bill intended to satisfy this purpose had been framed by the
Privy Council in Dublin and forwarded to England. A second
bill, designed to impose severe penalties on Catholic priests who
came into Ireland from abroad, had also been enclosed. How-
ever, in England there was resistance to the measures proposed
to the extent that when parliament convened in Ireland in Sep-
tember neither of the two bills forwarded by the Irish Privy
Council to London had been returned. Only after repeated calls
from the Dublin executive was the bill ‘to prevent priests coming
in’ sent back. The more contentious bill ‘to prevent the further
growth of popery’, which was intended to disable Catholics from
retaining or inheriting certain lands, was withheld pending fur-
ther consideration. As a result an impatient Irish Commons, in
which Brodrick’s Cork Squadron was beginning to prove very
difficult, framed an even more vindictive bill. It was forwarded
13
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to England with the explicit threat that any amendment to its
contents would jeopardize supply [Connolly, 1992; O’Regan,
2000].
Contesting Financial Information and ‘Great Discoveries’: The
centrality of supply, and the difficulties that the government
anticipated were hinted at in the Lord Lieutenant’s opening
speech to the new parliament on 24 September, when he alluded
to an opening deficit that had accrued as a result of additional
expenditure incurred by the government on the island’s security:
. . . the Government has expended a very considerable
sum toward the building of the Barracks, more than
was given by the Parliament for that purpose; and when
you are fully informed of the particulars, I have no
doubt but you will give as great testimonies of respect
and affection to her Majesty as you have given to any of
her Royal Predecessors [CJI, 24 Sept. 1703].
To assist members he had ‘ordered all the accompts to be laid
before you, by which you will perceive’ that government protes-
tations of the existence of a sizeable opening deficit were accu-
rate. He was not reassured, however, by the rather curt response
from the members. While indicating a willingness ‘to do all in
our power, under our present circumstances, for discharging the
debts of the nation, and defraying the expense of the establish-
ment under the best of Queens and your Grace’s most happy
government’, they promised nothing by way of the quantum or
length of supply [CJI, 25 Sept. 1703].
The process of voting supply commenced on September 29
with the laying before the Commons of the revenue accounts
and records. This was followed by the nomination of various
members to the Public Accounts Committee. Despite consider-
able Court party opposition, Laurence Clayton, a close associate
of Speaker Brodrick, was appointed as chairman. Other sup-
porters of Brodrick, including his brother, Thomas and Oliver St
George also took key positions. Only at this point did the Com-
mons, acting as a supply committee of the whole house, vote to
receive the government’s own supply bill. The implication was
clear - members saw it as their right to initiate the supply pro-
cess. The intentions of the house became even more evident
when it voted to defer consideration of the amount of supply
until after a full investigation of the accounts by the newly
elected Public Accounts Committee. Essentially, the quantum
would not be discussed until the members had had an opportu-
14
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nity to examine the accounts for themselves [CJI, 29, 30 Sept,
1703; CJI, 2 Oct. 1703; McGrath, 2000].
This put the focus on the Public Accounts Committee and
its members in a way that had not occurred before. It also
meant that the members now had a forum which acted as a
proxy for other matters and which, properly managed, could be
used to place tangible constraints on the executive and its offi-
cials. In all of this the capacity of members to master and ma-
nipulate the mass of accounting data with which they would be
confronted would be a key factor in determining the success or
otherwise of the Whig strategy. In order to assist the committee
in analyzing and understanding the revenue accounts, particu-
larly the very detailed records presented by Sir William
Robinson, Deputy Vice-Treasurer, it was decided that ‘all mer-
chants and accomptants’ that were members of the Commons
would be automatically entitled to join the committee. It was
official recognition that individuals with the skills to audit and
investigate financial records had a role to play. It was also an
acknowledgement of the fact that, in an environment in which
‘gentlemanly’ status was seen as a crucial determinant of social
standing, their function was not perceived as being at odds with
respectability. Their skills would be needed, as Clayton had set
out a course of action that would involve intense scrutiny of
both officials and their records. Over a three-week period, mem-
bers would be required to sit through long hours of dreary com-
mittee work and undertake a thorough investigation of a volu-
minous quantity of vouchers, books and returns submitted by
revenue officials, Sheriffs and collectors. Clayton later described
the committee’s modus operandi:
In obedience to the order of this House, the Com-
mittee for taking into their consideration the public ac-
counts of the Nation have met and divided themselves
into several sub committees and have sat de die in diem
early and late both mornings and afternoons to give the
quicker dispatch to that great affair committed to their
charge. [Public Accounts Committee minutes, Frazer
Ms 10, 2/465/23, unfoliated [hereafter: PAC Minutes]].
The accounts received from the Deputy Vice-Treasurer ap-
peared, at first sight, to support the government’s case for an
immediate and substantial increase in the additional supply. His
schedule of charges for the nine months to Michaelmas 1703,
less payments made to date, indicated an amount outstanding of
£103,368, relating principally to pay arrears [see Exhibit 1].
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In yet another schedule he indicated that arrears would increase
substantially over subsequent years if additional duties were not
granted by parliament [see Exhibit 2].
Even allowing that the establishment remained the same as
for 1703, i.e., £325,947, projected income from the hereditary
revenue of £240,000 would leave a deficit for the forthcoming
year of almost £85,947. This would result in a total debt of just
over £275,000 after two years if no additional revenues were
granted. The various Public Accounts sub-committees for expen-
EXHIBIT 1
Arrears due to Clear the Civil and Military Lists
to 29 September 1703
Source: Commons Journals of Ireland, Appendix cv
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diture on the barracks, non-resident pensions, vouchers for all
payments, and examining the establishment, immediately sum-
moned revenue officials to provide documentation dating back
to 1694. These were to include information relating to the ways
in which individual collectors throughout the country managed
their affairs as well as vouchers, receipts and expenditure rolls
from the exchequer in Dublin Castle. When the revenue officials
delayed, the members threatened them with censure. News of
the activities of the various sub-committees began to filter back
to the Commons where Brodrick attempted to exploit matters by
allowing various motions condemning excess expenditure of
£60,000 on a new barracks, the imposition of additional non-
resident pensions, laxity in the issuance of receipts and an in-
crease in official salaries. The Speaker’s followers then at-
tempted to bring attention to specific additions to the pension
list. Government supporters countered that the House should
simply agree to provide for all pay arrears as well as the pro-
jected deficit. When this was defeated buoyant Whigs taunted
government supporters with threats of ‘great discoveries’ by the
Public Accounts Committee. With this attention returned to the
committee and its eagerly awaited first report [PAC Minutes,
passim; CJI, 30 Sept, 6 Oct, 1703; McGrath, 2000].
The Public Account Committee continued to meet daily
prior to a critical session of the House supply committee sched-
EXHIBIT 2
A State of the Present Revenue Debt due at
Michaelmas 1703 . . . (Extract)
Source: Commons Journals of Ireland, Appendix cvi
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uled for 7 October. Amid reports of alarming ‘discoveries’ in the
accounts, Whig members began to complain about delays on the
part of some officials in forwarding accounts, as well as of the
huge mass of documentation being submitted by others. Even
with the assistance of the newly recruited accomptants, it was
proving impossible to carry out more than a cursory audit.
Court supporters countered that Whigs were simply seeking ex-
cuses to prolong their investigation and proposed that a report
be drafted immediately. With the assistance of the Speaker, the
committee again secured more time to investigate the accounts
and records. At this point government officials intervened in an
attempt to broker a compromise. In a private meeting, Chief
Secretary Southwell reminded Brodrick that reports of his con-
duct had reached the queen, who had expressed annoyance that
a man entrusted with the position of Speaker was now working
to counter official policy. Brodrick replied that he was acting in
the interests of his country and refused to consider anything
other than a one-year supply. He intended, he warned, to exploit
the supply issue to ensure that there were annual parliaments in
Ireland, a view he repeated in private meetings with various
government officials [CJI, 20 Oct. 1703; PAC Minutes, passim.,
O’Regan, 2000; McGrath, 2000].
When the Public Accounts Committee convened on October
12 to finalize its first Report, it did so confident that it had the
support of the Speaker and the bulk of the speaking members of
the Irish Commons. Clayton began his presentation by com-
plaining of the difficulties presented by uncooperative officials
and the sheer mass of documentation they had had to work
through:
The Books are so very voluminous, the Articles so very
many, the papers that were necessary for our informa-
tion not being made up in time by the proper officers
but above all the shortness of the days given us to bring
in our report, rendered it impossible to give in a full
and exact account of the several branches of the
Establishment…[PAC Minutes].
Nevertheless, using figures provided by the revenue officials,
and by Sir William Robinson in particular, the committee had
managed to put together a detailed nine-page Report in draft
form that dealt with a range of items in considerable detail. It
was introduced by a rough outline of the financial position
drawn up by the committee that completely reconfigured the
accounting information provided by officials [see Exhibit 3].
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With a view to challenging the government’s contention that
substantial arrears existed, the committee proceeded to put to-
gether a statement that did not follow the traditional approach
of the Exchequer. For a start, opening cash amounts of £53,061
indicated as in the hands of collectors in records submitted by
officials were included as opening balances immediately avail-
able to the government. In fact, they were merely charges
against Collectors that were unlikely ever to be received by the
Exchequer. Furthermore, collection arrears of £43,200 were also
indicated as part of the government’s income, despite the fact
that many dated back to pre-war years and were unlikely ever to
be collected [McGrath, 2000]. By these and other means, includ-
ing incorporating several of Robinson’s own figures for receipts
and payments, the committee believed it had established that
the true position at September 30 was actually a surplus of
£79,661. This was radically at odds with the opening debt of
£103,368 put forward by the government. Even after allowing
for additional expenditures of £42,390 submitted by Robinson
just prior to the meeting, the committee was satisfied that the
state of the nation’s finances was far healthier than the executive
EXHIBIT 3
Report from the Committee to Examine Public Accounts
Source: Commons Journals of Ireland, Appendix cv
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was allowing [PAC Minutes; CJI, 12 Oct, 1703 and Appendices
cx-cxviii].
When the committee’s report was presented to the Com-
mons on October 13 Brodrick and the majority of speakers en-
thusiastically endorsed it. On a motion, members resolved that
the monies granted by the 1699 parliament had been sufficient
to clear all debts up to September 1703. There would be no
need, therefore, for additional duties to cover any arrears for the
period to date: government demands for sufficient funds to clear
the supposed opening deficit of £103,368 could be dismissed.
Furthermore, members refused to speculate on the amount that
would be required for 1703-04, as they would not allow their
investigations to be prejudiced by questions of the quantum. In
addition, they recommended that only additional duties suffi-
cient to cover ‘necessary branches of the establishment’ be
granted: the house was effectively allowing itself scope to con-
tinue to investigate the government’s expenditure and to deter-
mine for itself what was and what was not ‘necessary’ [CJI, 13,
14 Oct. 1703].
In the debates that followed the contributions of both
Whigs and Court party supporters were even more rancorous.
Whigs concentrated on the ‘designed fraud’ perpetrated by the
government and its officials in the accounting figures that un-
derpinned their calculations. This led them to propose that only
a one-year supply be granted, arguing that the annual parlia-
ments that would result were the best means of ensuring that
there would be no repeat of the deception now uncovered. How-
ever, in impugning the Lord Lieutenant, Brodrick pressed mat-
ters too far. Seizing the initiative, and persuading various mod-
erate members to support them, the Court party succeeding in
obtaining a small majority, 122-119, in favor of a counter mo-
tion that the supply be for two years. At Brodrick’s initiative,
Whigs once more rallied: the committee and its work was highly
commended and it was:
Resolved that the thanks of this House be given by the
Speaker to the committee appointed to inspect and ex-
amine the public Accompts of the nation, for their great
care and faithful and diligent discharge of the trust re-
posed in them, whereby they have saved the kingdom
the sum of £103,368/8/4 which by misrepresentation
was charged as a debt on the nation. And accordingly
Mr Speaker gave the thanks of the house to Major
Clayton, chairman, and the rest of the gentlemen of the
said committee.
20
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 30 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol30/iss2/5
125O’Regan: Accountability and Financial Control as ‘Patriotic’ Strategies
Nor could the Court party protect Vice-Treasurer Robinson,
who was declared unfit for any public employment and commit-
ted to the Constable of Dublin Castle where he was to be incar-
cerated [CJI, 14, 16 Oct. 1703; McGrath, 2000].
Encouraged by their success in recruiting those country
members who were anxious to bring the session to a conclusion
so that they could return to their properties, the Court party
immediately attempted to raise the matter of the quantum. They
suggested that an amount of £170,000 over two years would be
sufficient. This was a significant reduction on earlier demands
and an implicit acknowledgment that the Public Accounts
Committee’s actions had effectively sabotaged government at-
tempts to have the opening deficit covered by the supply pro-
cess. Whigs countered that this was presumptuous given that
other branches of the establishment remained to be examined
and so the total requirement could not yet be determined. Their
resistance was boosted by Brodrick who had initiated an Address
to the queen on the state of the nation. This reflected the anger
of the Anglo-Irish at the way in which corrupt officials and
forfeiture trustees had undermined Ireland’s constitution. It also
explicitly articulated the link between regular parliaments and
accountability that Whigs had been trying to establish:
The want of holding frequent parliaments in your
majesty’s Kingdom of Ireland has been a great encour-
agement to evil-minded men, who intend nothing but
their own gain, though accompanied with the ruin and
oppression of your majesty’s good subjects. Many civil
officers are arrived at such a pitch of corruption,
through hopes of impunity, as is almost insupportable;
thereby getting vast estates in a short time in a poor
country, and others in considerable civil employments,
do dwell and reside for the most part out of the king-
dom, thereby neglecting the personal attendance on
their duties; whilst in the meantime their offices (which
in effect are made mere sinecures) are but indifferently
executed, to the great detriment of your majesty’s good
subjects and the great failure of justice. So that we,
your majesty’s dutiful subjects, are fully convinced, that
nothing but frequent parliaments, with a permission for
them to sit and do business of the nation, can prevent
or reform so great and notorious abuses [CJI, 20 Oct.
1703].
Government Resistance and the Dilution of Controls: In the after-
math of several days of contention that had shown the Whig and
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Court parties to be roughly equal in strength, attention now
focused once again on the Public Accounts Committee, which
had undertaken to produce yet another report, this time in-
tended to focus specifically on ways in which the cost of the
establishment could be reduced [CJI, 14, 16 Oct. 1703; PAC Min-
utes; McGrath, 2000]. With a view to such a report, the commit-
tee had been continuing its investigations of the accounts and
various officials. The members focused in the main on the
charges on the establishment, and in particular on the large
number of pensions being paid to people outside of the country.
The intention was to reduce expenditure to such an extent that a
small supply would be sufficient to cover the establishment until
1705. On October 19 a second report from the Public Accounts
Committee was laid before the house. It listed a number of ex-
penditures with which the committee had problems. These
ranged from pensions paid to individuals living outside the king-
dom to the regium donum, a subvention paid to support dissent-
ing ministers. They amounted in total to £86,667.3 However,
when the Report was examined, government officials pointed
out that the bulk of these commitments were by patent, mean-
ing that they could not be reduced or removed. With this much
of the Whig impetus was lost [PAC Minutes; CJI, iii, Appendices
cxx-cxxii; McGrath, 2000].
The Dublin executive and Court party were now in the as-
cendant and Whig strategy was reduced to merely attempting to
so complicate the discussion on the quantum that the executive
would be forced to concede a lower figure. With the intention of
undermining the government’s proposal that £170,000 be ac-
cepted as the quantum, Clayton quickly put together a third
Report. With its various appendices, this Report contained de-
tails of a variety of expenditures and outlined several ways in
which the establishment might be reduced. The Commons re-
ceived it on October 22 and resolutions were passed approving
19 of the 21 recommendations. These called for reductions in, or
cancellations of, various pensions and other charges. By this late
stage, however, the Whig faction realized that there was little
prospect of further exploiting the supply process to achieve
broader political aims. When the committee returned to a
3 The following items were specifically identified as worthy of investigation:
Pensions to individuals who reside out of the kingdom: £14,613; pensions due in
respect of to French Regiments and officers, etc., £24,226 Half-pay officers,
£6,278; Quit Rent concessions granted to papists, £13,995; particular grants on
his majesty’s letters over and above the establishment, £27,555.
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discussion of quantum a compromise of £150,000 over two
years to September 1705 was quickly agreed. Significantly, and
much to the discomfort of Secretary Southwell, who envisaged a
repeat of the accounting techniques employed earlier by the
Public Accounts Committee to create projected surpluses, the
quantum was only approved subject to the provision that this
figure would be reduced by any amount that could subsequently
be shown as due from the government to the nation [PAC Min-
utes; CJI, 22, 25 Oct., 10 Nov. 1703 and Appendix cxxiii].
Once the length of supply and the quantum had been deter-
mined, questions relating to supply now moved out of the ambit
of the Public Accounts Committee and reverted to a ‘ways and
means committee’. And with the Court party in the ascendant,
additional excise duties were quickly agreed for a two-year pe-
riod from November 1703. Within days Heads of a Money bill
had been agreed and transmitted to England for the approval of
the Privy Council there. However, as Southwell had feared,
Whig members did succeed in insinuating into the budget a
projected surplus for Quit Rents, based on their own calcula-
tions, of £31,213 for the half-year to September 1703. Neverthe-
less, the initiative remained with the government and the Court
party. In early November the government secured an additional
excise of £30,000 on the second year as well as a renewal of
various other duties to the value of £8,000 [CJI, 8, 10, 12, Nov.
1703]. By the end of the month the principal heads of the Money
bill had been secured and the session was prorogued until the
New Year. When returned from England in February 1704 the
bill enjoyed an easy passage through the Lords and was eventu-
ally given the royal assent on March 4 [CJI, 4 Mar. 1704].
For an executive used to cajoling and bribing its way to
having its policies implemented, this had been a traumatic ses-
sion. Despite having been ultimately stymied in their ambition
to see the length of supply reduced to one year, the Whig fac-
tion, primarily by exploiting the possibilities offered by their
dominance of the Public Accounts Committee, had succeeded in
materially impacting the entire fiscal process. Thus, members’
authority to censure officials and access all accounts and vouch-
ers had been confirmed; the committee had secured the right to
determine what was and what was not ‘necessary’ expenditure;
and, most critically, official calculations of an opening debt had
effectively been dismissed, thus materially impacting the quan-
tum granted, while ongoing estimates of projected revenues and
expenditures were open to revision. Ormonde, who had been
both humiliated and weakened by the episode, was unable to
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refrain from indicating the executive’s disapproval. Conscious of
the subtle, if significant, change in procedures that had seen the
Irish parliament secure a greater level of accountability over the
actions of the executive, he alluded in his closing address to the
accounting policy instituted by the public accounts committee
in its assessment of government budgetary requirements as the
principal, if misguided, source of official anxiety:
It were indeed to be wished that you . . . could have now
provided for what is still owing to the civil and military
lists; and the rather, because the arrears (a state of
which the commissioners of the revenue were ordered
by me to lay before you at the opening of parliament)
must be applied to make good the deficiencies of the
current year, as has been done in former govern-
ments . . . [CJI, 4 March, 1704].
As the Lord Lieutenant and his executive saw it, the members of
the Public Accounts Committee had succeeded in introducing a
fundamental change into the nature of the relationship between
the government and the governed. And this had been achieved,
primarily, by forcing a change in the manner in which items
were accounted for - arrears were no longer to be ‘applied to
make good the deficiencies of the current year, as has been done
in former governments’, but incorporated as part of the pro-
jected income for future periods.
CONCLUSIONS
The parliament of 1703-1704 saw the evolution of a more
sophisticated process for formulating and securing supply. In
this the Public Accounts Committee was a central player, its
actions and reports shaping the eventual supply bill in terms of
both its quantum and longevity. And the functioning of the Pub-
lic Accounts Committee itself reflected a more focused and for-
malized approach to the task at hand, with accomptants re-
cruited to assist in the investigation and audit of government
records and officers. The financial reports that resulted, and the
accounting calculations underpinning them, were more exten-
sive and comprehensive than the Anglo-Irish polity had hereto-
fore produced. They were also instrumental in ensuring the cen-
trality of accounting information as a key, mediating factor in
the relationship between a government and those it preferred to
categorize as dependants, but who imagined themselves as
equals.
In securing a critical accountability and financial control
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function for the Public Accounts Committee, this Irish Whig
faction succeeded in changing the dynamics of the constitu-
tional arrangement between England and Ireland. Principles of
accountability and financial control were now firmly established
as part of the supply process. The colonial power could no
longer assume the pliant acquiescence of its erstwhile agents.
The ‘sole right’ and constitutional issues had been inextricably
linked and a forum in which the ambitions of the political na-
tion might be advanced had been identified and secured. By
exploiting and leveraging their command of accounting infor-
mation, parliamentary procedures and the simmering resent-
ment of the political nation, an Irish Whig faction had suc-
ceeded in appropriating to the Irish parliament various elements
of the Revolution Settlement that they believed to be rightfully
theirs.
This episode extends our understanding, therefore, of the
role of accounting information within the colonial context, in
particular as it is used to realize the regulative and distributive
ambitions of powerful elites. The language and impulses of colo-
nialism are useful in highlighting the fact that the fissiparous
tendencies of colonial enterprises are both constrained and un-
leashed by technologies of control such as accounting [Neu,
1999, 2000b]. Thus, accounting information can be shown to
represent not only a means of exerting control from a distance,
but also of subverting relationships within the hierarchy of pow-
ers that constitute the imperial force. Accounting information
not only inscribes and expresses the unequal power relations
that exist between the colonial power and the colonized [Tinker,
1980], but also represents a potent medium by which the con-
stantly mutating relationship that exists between the metropoli-
tan centre and its agents can be both imagined and mapped.
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